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We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty
and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators’
and punishers’ decisions when the other side’s behavior is exogenously given. Equilibrium effects account
for the interdependency of these decisions. This interdependency is important since, in the case of legal
uncertainty, higher fines may reduce the willingness to punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence
effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects empirically by means of
a strategy-method design in which potential violators can condition their behavior on the behavior of
potential punishers and vice versa. All our experimental findings on both partial and equilibrium effects
are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theory.
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1 Introduction
Two fundamental insights of the economic analysis of law are that deterrence is increasing in the magnitude
of fines (Becker, 1968) and the accuracy of the court system (Png, 1986, Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). For
the latter point, it has been noted that both higher frequencies of convicting innocent defendants (type-I
errors) and higher percentages of releasing guilty defendants (type-II errors) have detrimental effects as the
incentives to obey the law depend on the difference in the expected fine with and without violating the law.
∗Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany, E-mail:
schildberg-hoerisch@uni-bonn.de
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The deterrence effect of higher fines is straightforward when type-I and type-II errors are exogenously
given, which is usually assumed in the literature.1 In reality, however, the frequencies of these two error
types do not only depend on the evidence and the accuracy of the court system, but also on the relative
weights judges and juries put on them: For a given quality of evidence, which is a noisy signal of the suspects’
actual behavior, legal decision makers can reduce type-I errors at the expense of higher type-II errors and
vice versa. In particular, legal decision makers’ aversion against type-I errors may increase in the fine size. If
this effect is strong enough and anticipated by potential violators, then higher fines may even lead to lower
deterrence (Andreoni, 1991). To understand the impact of fines and uncertainty on deterrence, it is hence
important to take the interdependency of the decisions by potential violators and legal decision makers into
account.
We are the first to develop a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment to distinguish between the
partial and the equilibrium effects of fines and uncertainty: For partial effects, we follow the overwhelming
part of the literature which considers their impact on the behavior of one ”market side” (i.e. violators or
judges) under the simplifying assumption that the behavior of the other market side is exogenously given.
For instance, we analyze the impact of the fine on the violation frequency when the punishment frequency is
independent of the fine. Our analysis then confirms the intuition that higher fines reduce both the violation
and the punishment frequency, while higher uncertainty increases the violation, but reduces the punishment
frequency.
Things are less straightforward, however, when we consider equilibrium effects. In equilibrium, judges
are aware that higher legal uncertainty increases the incentives to violate the law, which in turn increases the
punishment incentive compared to the case in which the number of violators is exogenously given. Hence,
equilibrium effects may well differ from partial effects; not only with respect to the size, but even with
respect to the sign. Our theoretical model allows to capture and to compare partial and equilibrium effects.
We find that, even in equilibrium, the punishment frequency of judges decreases in the fine size, and the
violation frequency increases in legal uncertainty. The impacts of the fine on the violation frequency and of
uncertainty on the punishment frequency, however, are theoretically ambiguous.
Based on our theoretical model, we have designed a laboratory experiment that allows us to distinguish
between the partial and the equilibrium effects of legal uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on violation
and punishment. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two roles, V (”violators”) and J (”judges”).2
Next, pairs consisting of one participant V and one participant J are matched. All participants are informed
that, for each pair, there is a fixed amount of money designated for donation to charity. Participant V
can take this money for himself. If it is not taken, it may still disappear due to a random event, and this
creates legal uncertainty. Each participant J can punish his randomly assigned participant V if and only if
he observes that the money has disappeared.
We consider two fine levels and two degrees of uncertainty, which leads to four different decision situations.
To distinguish between partial and equilibrium effects, we employ a strategy method design in which players
of one type can condition their behavior on the behavior of the other types. We have two treatments. In the
first treatment, the strategy method is applied for players J , while players V decide unconditionally whether
to take the money or not. In the second treatment, the strategy method applies to players V , and players
J decide unconditionally whether to punish or not to punish. This procedure allows us to calculate partial
as well as equilibrium effects: For instance, the partial effect of the fine size on the players J ’s behavior is
calculated by comparing the punishment frequencies that would have occurred if the violation frequencies
were the same for different fine sizes. For the equilibrium effect, we compare the punishment frequencies for
1See the overview in Polinsky and Shavell (2000, Section 15).
2In order to avoid framing, the participant types were denoted A and B in the instructions, which are provided in the
Appendix.
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the fine-dependent actual violation frequencies.
Note that the frequencies of type-I and type-II errors are determined endogenously by the decisions of
players V and J , so that the interdependency of violation and punishment decisions is fully captured by
our experiment. In particular, for a given probability that the money disappears by a random event, the
risk of making a type-I error in case of punishment is strictly decreasing in the number of actual violators.
Analogously, the risk of making a type-II error in case of no punishment increases in the violation frequency.
Thus, for given behavior of judges, the violation frequency in the strategy method translates each number
of violators into a probability for error types.
Our experimental results are fully in line with the theoretical predictions. For partial effects, we confirm
the literature that higher fines reduce both the violation and the punishment frequency. Uncertainty increases
the number of violations and decreases the punishment frequency. As outlined above, equilibrium effects are
theoretically less straightforward, but our empirical findings are again in line with our model: First, a higher
fine leads to a significant reduction in the punishment frequency if and only if there is legal uncertainty.
Second, the equilibrium impact of legal uncertainty on the punishment frequency is lower than the partial
effect, and this holds for both fine levels. The intuition for this result is that the violation incentive is larger
for the case with uncertainty, and this reduces players J ’s incentive to punish less in response to higher
uncertainty. Third, the equilibrium impact of the fine size on the violation frequency is less pronounced
than the partial impact, which can be attributed to the fact that players J punish less often. Fourth, legal
uncertainty leads to a pronounced incline in the violation frequency even in equilibrium, which reinforces
the view that legal uncertainty is worrisome not only from a justice point of view, but also from a deterrence
perspective. Last, comparing partial and equilibrium effects shows that the difference is sizable, especially for
changes in the magnitude of sanctions. Thus, our results support the case for legislation to take equilibrium
effects into account.
So far, most experimental papers on punishments have adopted voluntary contribution mechanisms
(VCMs), in which the participants can mutually sanction non-cooperative behavior (e.g., Fehr and Gächter,
2000). There are only a few VCM experiments with punishment which assume noisy signals or vary the
magnitude of fines. Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Thöni (2010) assume that participants get noisy signals on
their mutual contributions in a VCM game and find that higher noise, which increases the risk of type-I
errors in case of penalties, does not reduce the punishment frequency. Social welfare, however, shrinks due
to retaliation of those who are innocently punished and because fines are costly. While fines are kept con-
stant in Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Thöni (2010), Ambrus and Greiner (2012) consider different fine levels in
a standard VCM game. With low fines, people do not punish often, thereby saving on punishment costs.
When fines are high, there is a large deterrence effect which improves social efficiency. As both of these
beneficial effects are small for intermediate levels of punishment, efficiency is U-shaped in the magnitude of
fines. This is related to results in Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) on the impact
of fine sizes on punishments and contributions in VCM settings. Rege and Telle (2004) find that revealing
the identities of non-contributors increases cooperation, and Nikiforakis (2008) show that the punishment
frequency decreases sharply when counter-punishments are feasible.
In contrast to these VCM settings, our research question requires a setup with a clear-cut distinction
between violators and legal decision makers: each participant is assigned to just one role; as ”judge” or
”violator”. Moreover, legal fines better resemble a situation with third-party punishment, in which those
who can punish are not directly affected by the behavior of violators. Additionally, we assume that fines
are costless for those who impose them, since judges themselves do not bear the social costs of punishment.
Finally, VCM games are, by definition, about voluntary payments, whereas taking money designated for
donation in our setting comes closer to legal infringements.
Some papers adopt third party punishment, but neither consider uncertainty nor the interdependence
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of violation and punishment. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) compare third and second party punishment
in response to the behavior in a dictator game. Selfish behavior is punished under both circumstances,
but to a larger degree by affected second parties. Carpenter (2007) finds that punishment decreases in the
cost of punishment, and similar results are reported by Anderson and Putterman (2006) for VCM-settings.
Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2011) consider third party punishment in ten variants of a game in which one
party can decide on different allocations of money. Parties allocating a larger amount to themselves are
frequently punished, even in cases in which the resulting allocation is efficient as it maximizes the overall
amount. As in our paper, Baumann and Friehe (2015) use a setting in which potential violators may take
some money and can be punished by a third party. Focusing on the equilibrium effect only, they confirm our
result that potential violators are more likely to take the money when legal uncertainty is high. However, they
do not find any differences in the punishment probability across groups with different levels of sanctions.
Since they do not use a strategy-method approach, they cannot compare equilibrium effects with partial
effects.
In order to test Becker’s (1968) deterrence hypothesis in the laboratory, Harbaugh, Mocan, and Visser
(2013), Khadjavi (2015), Rizzolli and Stanca (2012), and Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair (2012) use
take game designs in which participants can ”steal” from their counterparts’ endowments with exogenous
punishment schemes (fine sizes and probabilities of punishment). Overall, these papers confirm that the
violation frequency is decreasing in fines and probability of punishment. However, Schildberg-Hörisch and
Strassmair (2012) and Khadjavi (2015) find that small sanctions reduce deterrence compared to no sanctions
which might be explained by a crowding out of intrinsic motivation for socially appreciated behavior.3 Several
more papers test the effect of exogenous punishment schemes using various laboratory setups. Abbink,
Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) document the deterrent effect of probabilistic sanctions in an experiment on
corruption, Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) for cheating on an incentivized quiz. Friesen (2012) uses a design in
which subjects receive exogenous profits and have to decide whether to comply with a regulation at some
certain cost or to violate at no immediate cost but facing the possibility of being inspected and subsequently
fined. She finds that increasing the severity of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent
increase in the probability of punishment. Finally, DeAngelo and Charness (2012) use a roadway speeding
framing and show that committed violations decrease in the expected cost of speeding and in uncertainty
about the probability of punishment. In contrast, our paper analyzes endogenously arising punishment
patterns and, to the best of our knowledge, is the first one that compares the partial and the equilibrium
effects of fines and uncertainty.
The famous Blackstone ratio states that it is ”better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffers”. Most people share the view that avoiding type-I errors matters more, but the marginal
rate of substitution between both error types varies considerably (Volokh, 1997). We argue that those who
put more emphasis on type-I errors in fact punish less often.4 By using a take game, Rizzolli and Stanca
(2012) show experimentally that the adverse effects of type-I errors on deterrence are higher than those of
type-II errors. In their experimental setting, the probabilities of the two errors types are given exogenously,
i.e. they do not consider the behavior of participants in their role as judges. By contrast, we focus on the
interdependence of the two market sides.
In our experiment, the equilibrium deterrence effect of higher fines is reduced by the fact that players J
3Falk and Fischbacher (2002) use a take game to show that subjects ”steal” more from their peers, the more their peers
”steal”.
4To account for the Blackstone ratio, some models simply put higher weight on type-I errors in analyzing optimal judgments
(Miceli, 1991, Lando, 2006), and several papers explain from a rational choice perspective why type-I errors are more severe
for society (see Hylton and Khanna (2007) who take up a public choice perspective, and Persson and Siven (2007) who adopt
a median-voter model).
4
punish less often. This effect dates back to the early legal literature on nullification pioneered by Michael
and Wechsler (1937) which argues that jurors or witnesses may not be willing to participate in legal action
when punishments seem unfairly high. Accordingly, theoretical models show that higher fines even reduce
deterrence when the willingness to accept type-I errors is decreasing in fines to a sufficiently large extent
(Andreoni, 1991, Feess and Wohlschlegel, 2009).
The legal literature has pointed out that the likelihood of type I- relative to type II-errors depends on the
legal allocation of the burden of proof which is strikingly different in common and civilian law. In the US,
decisions on civil claims are based on preponderance of evidence, while the proof beyond reasonable doubt-
principle applied in criminal cases carries to a large degree over to civil claims in Europe (see Clermont
and Sherwin, 2002 and Taruffo, 2003 for a dispute on these principles). Engel (2009) points out that the
controversy about the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof needs to be related to the different goals
of judicial procedures, and to the underlying assumptions on how legal decision makers actually reach their
verdicts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical model on the
interdependency of the judges’ and the potential violators’ decisions. While the partial effects confirm the
previous literature, we show that the impacts of the signal’s noise and the magnitude of fines on deterrence
and punishment are far from straightforward. In section 3, we describe the experimental setting. Section 4
provides empirical results for the partial impacts of fines and uncertainty, and section 5 extends to equilibrium
effects. We conclude in section 6.
2 A model of punishment and deterrence
We first develop a model that allows to analyze the impact of fine size and uncertainty on the interplay
between punishment and deterrence. In basic models on errors in court (Png, 1986, Polinsky and Shavell,
1999), it is found that both type-I and type-II errors increase the violation frequency as the difference between
the probability of being punished with and without violation shrinks. A full-fledged equilibrium analysis,
however, needs to take into account that higher uncertainty and higher fines may reduce the decision makers’
(judges or juries) willingness to punish, so that the relative probabilities for the two errors need to be derived
endogenously.
The interdependency of the behavior of judges and violators implies that we cannot treat type-I and type-
II errors as exogenous - the probability of convicting an innocent (type-I error) depends on the percentage
of violators in equilibrium, which in turn depends on the (anticipated) punishment behavior of judges.
Consider a potential violator who, in the case of an infringement, causes an adverse outcome.5 In case of
no infringement, an exogenous event causes the same adverse outcome with probability q.6 Note that this
assumption implies that the adverse outcome can occur only once. In our experiment, observing the adverse
outcome means that the money has disappeared, and q is the probability that this happens even in cases in
which it is not taken by the respective participant.
With φ as the percentage of participants who actually commit the act, the ex post probability that a
violation took place after observing the loss is φφ+(1−φ)q , and the ex post probability of no infringement is
(1−φ)q
φ+(1−φ)q . Thus, π =
(1−φ)q
φ+(1−φ)q is the probability of committing a type-I error in case of punishment, while
1− π = φφ+(1−φ)q is the probability of a type-II error in case of no punishment.
5In our experiment design, this corresponds to taking the amount designated for donation to charity.
6As in all models on errors in court, we need to assume that the facts of the case cannot be fully reconstructed ex post.
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For judges, we introduce the following assumptions: First, we set the utility from correct decisions to
zero, that is, we take only the preference costs of misjudgments, but not the benefits of correct decisions into
account. Second, we assume that judges take the consequences of their decisions for others into account.
Specifically, the disutility from a type-I error is assumed to be αiF where αi is a parameter on judge i’s
aversion against type-I errors, and F is the fine size. Likewise, a judge’s disutility from a type-II error is
βiA where βi is the degree of judge i’s aversion against type-II errors, and A the severity of the infringement
which we will refer to as the ”amount stolen”. Normalizing βi = 1, αi captures the ratio of the degrees of
aversion against type-I and type-II errors.
Recalling the probabilities of type-I and type-II errors, it follows that a judge i who assumes a violation
frequency φ prefers to convict a suspect if and only if
(1− φ) q
φ+ (1− φ) q
αiF ≤
φ
φ+ (1− φ) q
A. (1)










The first equation in (2) shows that punishment is more likely if judges expect a higher violation frequency
φ. The intuitive reason for this monotonic relationship between violation and punishment frequency is that
the probability of making a type-I error when punishing, π (a type-II error when not punishing, 1 − π)
is strictly decreasing (increasing) in the violation frequency. In other words, the punishment frequency as
an increasing function of the violation frequency can be transformed into a decreasing function of π, the
probability of making a type-I error, which is displayed in the second equation in (2). This demonstrates
that, when taking changes of the violation frequency into account, the well-known discussion of the impact
of type-I and type-II errors on judges’ punishment behavior becomes a discussion of the impact of violation
frequencies on punishment.
For potential violators, we define mj as a potential violator j’s intrinsic disutility from violating the law
or social norm. Furthermore, violators may also have other-regarding preferences towards potential victims.
Let us define a parameter v ∈ [0, 1) such that, for v = 0, violators are completely selfish, and for v = 1, they
put equal weight on the victims’ and their own payoffs. Hence, if individual j assumes punishment frequency
p, she steals if and only if
A− (1− v)p(A+ F )−mj ≥ vA(1− q)− qpF (1− v). (3)
On the left hand side, the expected benefit is the difference in the amount stolen and the expected fine,
less the violator’s disutility from stealing. Note that, in line with our experimental design, the expression
−(1− v)p(A+F ) implies that in case of conviction both the amount and the fine are returned to the victim,
so that F can also be interpreted as damages. All of our Propositions also hold when we assume instead
that the injurer consumes A before detection and that F is not re-distributed to the victim but lost (as in
the case of imprisonment, for instance). On the right hand side, the donation, which yields the partially
altruistic violator utility vA, is made with probability 1 − q. Furthermore, qp is the probability of being
punished by mistake (type-I error), in which case the fine F is taken from the alleged violator and passed
on to the victim. Hence, individual j violates if and only if mj ≤ m̃ given by
m̃ = A[(1− p)(1− v) + qv]− Fp(1− q)(1− v). (4)
Equations (2) and (4) characterize the judges’ and violators’ optimal decisions based on their expectations
on their counterparts’ behavior: Inspecting these two equations yields the following Proposition:
6
Proposition 1 Suppose that violators treat the punishment frequency p, and judges the violation frequency
φ, as exogenously given. Then:
(i) ∂m̃∂p = −[A+ F (1− q)](1− v) < 0,
∂m̃
∂F = −p(1− q)(1− v) < 0, and
∂m̃












Part (i) of Proposition 1 first confirms the well-known deterrence theory: Violators are less likely to
violate if they assume a higher punishment probability p and the fine size F is larger. Furthermore, the
violation frequency increases in q, that is, in the probability that the loss may also be observed without
infringement. This resembles the literature on the impacts of errors in court discussed in the introduction.
Part (ii) discusses judges’ behavioral responses to the model parameters when they seek to minimize
expected preference costs from wrong decisions: When they assume violators to break the law more fre-
quently, when the evidence on the actual punishment is less noisy, and when fines are low, then judges will
also punish for higher aversion against type-I errors, so that α̃ increases. In a way, ∂m̃∂p characterizes how
violators’ best responses depend on the judges’ punishment frequency as, for any given p, a potential violator
steals if and only if m ≤ m̃. Similarly, ∂α̃∂φ captures the effect of the assumed violating frequency on judges’
best responses. While these individual best responses are intuitive, things are more involved when we take
the interdependency of the decisions into account. In Bayesian Nash equilibrium, judges’ and violators’ ex-
pectations about their counterparts’ actions coincide with their actual equilibrium choices, i.e., punishment
and violation frequencies are given by the system of equations
p = G (α̃) (5)
φ = H (m̃) , (6)
where G(.) and H(.) denote the cumulative distribution functions of judges’ parameter α of relative aversion
against type-I errors and potential violators’ aversion against wrongdoing, provided that the thresholds α̃
and m̃ are in the supports Sα of G(.) and Sm of H(.), respectively, the intersection of which determines the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of noise and the fine size on equilibrium punishment
and violation frequencies, where judges and violators correctly anticipate their counterparts’ equilibrium
choices:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Sα and Sm are intervals. If α̃ ∈ Sα and m̃ ∈ Sm, then the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium has the following comparative static properties:
(i) For all distributions G(·) and H(·), dp
∗
dF < 0 and
dφ∗
dq > 0.
(ii) The absolute equilibrium effects of legal uncertainty on the punishment frequency, and of the fine size
on the violation frequency, are smaller than the absolute partial effects derived in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Part (i) of the Proposition shows that, for all distributions of the judges’ and the potential violators’
preferences, two of the results derived for given behavior of the other market side carry over to the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium: First, the punishment frequency decreases in the magnitude of fines, dp
∗
dF < 0. This is
intuitive as, for all adjustments of the violators’ behavior, the consequences of a type-I error are increasing
in the fine size, so that judges are in equilibrium more reluctant to punish in case of high fines. Second, the
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standard result that higher uncertainty reduces deterrence, dφ
∗
dq > 0, also carries over from the setting with
exogenously given errors in court to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
However, the impacts of the fine size on the violations frequency (dφ
∗
dF ) and of the noise on the punishment
behavior (dp
∗
dq ) are ambiguous, and do hence not appear in the Proposition. The first ambiguity confirms
the results of Andreoni (1991) and Feess and Wohlschlegel (2009) that higher fines may reduce deterrence
if judges care sufficiently strongly about type I errors. The second ambiguity means that judges may even
increase their punishment frequency in response to higher noise when the violation frequency increases
sufficiently steeply in noise.
Part (ii) of the Proposition says that, whenever the equilibrium effects are ambiguous, they are less pro-
nounced than the partial effects. This is intuitive, since the countervailing effects that make the equilibrium
effects ambiguous are not present when the behavior of the other market side is treated as exogenously given.
3 Experimental design
Our objective is to analyze how judges’ punishment and potential violators’ decisions react to fines, legal
uncertainty, and the behavior of the other market side (violators or judges, respectively). In order to test
the predictions of our model in a comprehensive manner, our design has to ensure that we can compare
behavior under the assumption that players take the other market side’s decisions as given (partial effects,
see Proposition 1) to a situation in which players anticipate the other market side’s reaction to changes in
fines or legal uncertainty (equilibrium effects, see Proposition 2). For that reason, we employ a strategy
method design in which players of one market side can condition their behavior on the behavior of the other
market side. In two treatments, we vary between subjects whether judges or violators use the strategy
method, while the other market side decides unconditionally whether to violate or to punish, respectively.
Moreover, we vary the level of fine and legal uncertainty within subject: each participant faces four decision
situations that are characterized by different combinations of high or low levels of fines and legal uncertainty.
3.1 Punishment and violation decisions
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned the role of potential violators
(henceforth referred to as participants V ) or the role of judges (henceforth labeled participants J) with equal
probability. The instructions were framed neutrally, labeling potential violators as participants of type A
and judges as participants of type B, a fine as ”deduction points” and a violation as ”taking” instead of
stealing. A translation of the complete instructions of one treatment to English can be found in Appendix B.
Next, pairs consisting of one participant V and one participant J were matched randomly. Throughout the
experiment, assigned roles and pairs remained constant and players acted anonymously. Each participant
V and J had an initial endowment of 2400 points.7 Moreover, for each pair an additional 2400 points were
designated for donation to the charity ”SOS-Kinderdorf” (SOS Children’s Villages). The work of the charity
was described as follows: ”SOS-Kinderdorf supports children and families in the poorest regions of the world
(medical care, school enrollment etc.), in crisis areas, but also neglected children and adolescents in Germany.
SOS-Kinderdorf has been granted the DZI-certificate that attests reliability and low administrative costs.”
In order to model a violation decision, each participant V had to decide whether he would like to take
the donation designated for the charity for himself. In that case, there was no donation to the charity and
participant V ’s payoff increased by 2400 points to 4800 points. Participant J observed whether the donation
7During the experiment payments were calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points were converted into Euro
at the following exchange rate: 500 points = 1 Euro.
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was available or had disappeared. Importantly, whenever participant J observed that the donation had
disappeared, this could be due to two possible reasons: first, participant V had taken the donation. Second,
participant V had decided not to take the donation but it had disappeared by chance, which happened
with probability q. The parameter q varies across decision situations and captures legal uncertainty. Only
if participant J observed that the donation had disappeared, he had the possibility to punish V , i.e., to
reduce participant V ’s payoff by a prespecified fine of size F such that V ’s payoff was 2400 − F points. If
V was punished and had taken the donation, the donation was donated to the charity. If V was punished
although he had not taken the donation, the donation remained unavailable and was not donated. If fine F
was imposed on participant V , the F points were additionally donated to the charity. Donating the possible
fine to the charity has two advantages: First, it avoids potential concerns of participant J that punishing
reduces overall efficiency (defined as the sum of payments to participant V , J , and the charity). Second,
it resembles the common legal practice of donating a fine to a charity whose work is related to the field of
violation.8 If participant J decided not to punish participant V , V received his whole initial endowment of
2400 points. If V had taken the donation, the donation was added to V ’s payoff, V earned 4800 points, and
the charity did not receive any donation. In any case, participant J was paid 2400 points at the end of the
experiment. Thus, financial self-interest did not motivate participant J ’s behavior, but his decisions affected
participant V ’s payoff and the donation to the charity (only if there was a legal case, i.e., if the donation
had disappeared).
Each participant V and J faced four decision situations that differed only in the size of the fine F
(Flow = 1200 or Fhigh = 3600) and / or the extent of legal uncertainty q (qlow = 0 or qhigh = 0.5): first,
F = 1200 and q = 50%; second, F = 3600 and q = 50%; third, F = 1200 and q = 0; and finally, F = 3600
and q = 0 (see Table 1). Comparing behavior across decision situations enables us to isolate the effect of
changes in the fine for a given level of legal uncertainty and vice versa. The instructions described the decision
situation in general terms. The exact size of the fine and the level of uncertainty were only revealed on screen
just before making the respective decision.9 One of the four decision situations was chosen randomly and the
actual decisions of participants V and J in this decision situation determined their earnings and the amount
donated to the charity (if any).
Table 1: Treatment Overview
Treatment Decision situation
1 2 3 4
Player J strategy method F = 1200, q = 0.5 F = 3600, q = 0.5 F = 1200, q = 0 F = 3600, q = 0
(3 sessions, N=72)
Player V strategy method F = 1200, q = 0.5 F = 3600, q = 0.5 F = 1200, q = 0 F = 3600, q = 0
(3 sessions, N=72)
Finally, as shown in Table 1 in half of the sessions participants J used the strategy method for punishment
8A potential disadvantage of donating the fine is that, even if J believes that V did not take the donation, he could impose
the fine to redistribute from participant V to the charity if he is willing to incur the cost of ”convicting an innocent”. Our
questionnaire data show that participants are very reluctant to do so. Using a Likert scale from 0 (not bad at all) to 9 (extremely
bad), we asked participants how bad they personally feel if someone innocent is punished for something he has not done. The
mean answer is 8.2, no participant chose 0 or 1.
9However, the instructions used the decision situation with F = 1200 and q = 0.5 as an example to illustrate participants’
decision screens and carefully explained the implications of legal uncertainty, using the case with q = 0.5 as an example.
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decisions. For each of the four combinations of fine and legal uncertainty, they made 13 conditional, binary
punishment decisions, namely whether their matched participant V should be fined if the donation had
disappeared and x of the 12 participants V in the room had decided to take the donation, for each x ∈ {0, 12}.
At the same time, participants V made one unconditional violation decision for each of the four decision
situations, i.e., they decided whether to take the donation or not. Counting the number of violators in
the current session allowed to determine which of the judges’ conditional punishment decisions was actually
implemented.
Similarly, in the remaining sessions participants V made all violation decisions using the strategy method.
In each decision situation, they made 13 conditional, binary violation decisions, namely whether to take the
donation if y of the 12 participants J in the room decided to punish if the donation had disappeared, for
each y ∈ {0, 12}. At the same time, participants J made an unconditional punishment decision for each
of the four combinations of fine and legal uncertainty, i.e., they decided whether to punish their randomly
matched player V if they observed that the donation had disappeared. The number of punishing players J
in the current session determined which of player V ’s conditional violation decisions was implemented.
3.2 Measurement of beliefs and attitudes towards risk
Using the strategy method data, we will analyze equilibrium effects of changes in fine or legal uncertainty
under the assumption that participants correctly anticipate the other market side’s reaction to the change
under consideration. In order to be able to judge the validity of this assumption, we additionally measure
strategy method players’ beliefs concerning the behavior of the other market side. For each of the four
decision situations, participants J were asked to guess the number of participants V who had decided to
take the donation among the 12 players V present in the room. Similarly, participants V were asked for
their belief concerning the number of participants J among the 12 present participants J who decided to
impose the fine if they observed that the donation had disappeared. Participants knew that their belief for
one of the four decision situations would be drawn randomly and paid according to the belief’s precision.
More precisely, participants had the possibility to win additional 2000 points or 4 Euro. The probability of
winning increased in the precision of their belief and equaled pwin = 1−1/144 (belief - actual number)2. For
those participants who were interested in the exact payment scheme, the scheme was explained on screen.
This procedure of eliciting beliefs, the randomized quadratic scoring rule, follows Schlag and van der Weele
(2013) and incentivizes participants to report their beliefs truthfully, without imposing assumptions on their
risk preferences.
In order to measure participants’ risk preferences, we used a procedure similar to the one proposed by
Holt and Laury (2002). Participants had to decide whether they preferred a safe payment of 1200 points or
a lottery that would either pay 3000 with probability p or 0 points with probability (1− p). In ten separate
decisions, p was 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, or 1, respectively. One of the ten decisions was drawn
randomly and paid.
3.3 Procedural details and implementation
The detailed sequence of events in each session was as follows:
1. Instructions: Upon entering the lab, subjects drew a card containing a number and were asked to sit
in the respective booth. They read the instructions, were encouraged to ask questions in private, and
answered several control questions on the computer.
2. Four decision situations concerning punishment or violation behavior
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3. Measurement of beliefs concerning the behavior of the other player type: only strategy method players
4. Measurement of risk attitudes
5. Questionnaire10
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab, Germany with 144 participants, 72 in each treat-
ment. Most participants (94%) were students and majored in various subjects. Age varied between 18 and
57 years (median age 23, 92% in the range 19–30 years). We used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) for
conducting the experiment and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for inviting participants from the BonnEconLab’s
participant pool and recording their participation. The experiment took place in 6 sessions in June 2015.
In total, the experiment lasted about 60 minutes (including payment). On average, participants earned a
total of 14.20 Euro. Participants’ overall payments consisted of the sum of up to four payments: a show-up fee
of 4.00 Euro, the payment from one randomly drawn decision situation, the incentivized belief (for strategy
method players only) and the payment from one randomly drawn risk-related decision. Payments were made
in a separate room to ensure privacy. We donated a total of 676.80 Euro to the NGO ”SOS-Kinderdorf”,
which corresponds to the overall amount that participants had decided to donate.
4 Partial impacts of fine size and uncertainty
In our model, we have derived two kinds of results. The partial effects summarized in Proposition 1 capture
the impacts of the fine size F and legal uncertainty q on the violation frequency for given punishment
frequencies; and vice versa. The respective experimental results are presented in section 4. By contrast,
Proposition 2 refers to the total effects of changes in F or q in equilibrium, in which the reactions of the
other market side are anticipated. Results on the tests of Proposition 2 are discussed in section 5.
4.1 Players J
Following Proposition 1, we test three hypotheses on the behavior of players J :
H1. The punishment frequency increases in the violation frequency.
H2. For identical violation frequencies and with legal uncertainty, the punishment frequency is lower for
F = 3600 compared to F = 1200.
H3. For identical violation frequencies and fines, the punishment frequency is lower for q = 50% compared
to q = 0.
By definition of partial effects, the hypotheses are derived under the assumption that the violation
frequency is unaffected by F and q. Thus, we use the strategy method for players J , i.e., for each of our four
combinations of F and q we elicit players J ’s behavior for any number of actual violations by players V . As all
36 players J made decisions in four different situations, we have 144 observations when defining all decisions
for a specific F -q combination as a single observation. In line with H1, the Pearson’s pairwise correlation
coefficients between the number of violators and the number of punishing players J are significantly positive
at p < 0.001 for all four situations. Moreover, 135 of our 144 observations are consistent in the sense that the
punishment frequency is weakly increasing in the number of violators. As inconsistent behavior increases the
probability of both error types, players J who understand the setting should behave consistently; irrespective
10The post-experiment questionnaire measured socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Moreover, it assessed par-
ticipants’ general attitudes concerning moral behavior, donations to charity, individual responsibility for own actions, aversion
against legal type I and type II error, and judgments concerning determinants of the effectiveness of legal rules.
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of their relative aversion to type-I and type-II errors.11 For the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3, we exclude the 9
inconsistent observations from our analysis. Figure 1 displays the cumulative distribution of the punishment
frequency, i.e. the share of players J who punish for each possible numbers of violators. The number of

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of violating players V
low fine, high uncertainty high fine, high uncertainty
low fine, no uncertainty high fine, no uncertainty
Figure 1: Punishment frequencies.
Then, denote by Ṽi a threshold such that the i-th player J punishes if and only if V ≥ Ṽi. The cumulative
distribution in figure 1 also shows the distribution of thresholds over players J : Considering the low fine
(F = 1200) and high uncertainty (q = 50%) as an example, about 40% of all players J punish for 3 violators,
while more than 50% punish for 4 violators. Thus, the violation frequency threshold that triggers punishment
is 4 for 52%-40%=12% of all judges.
To test H2, we compare the thresholds for F = 1200 and F = 3600 for the case with legal uncertainty,
q = 50%. In line with H2, thresholds are significantly higher for F = 3600, with p = 0.03 in the Wilcoxon
signed ranks test.1213
11An example for inconsistent behavior is a player J who punished for two, but not for three violators. This player J , however,
could reduce both error types by punishing for three, but not for two violators.
12Since type-I errors are excluded for q = 0, our theory predicts a punishment frequency of 100%. However, the legal literature
discussed in the introduction has pointed out that some decision makers may prefer not to punish, even without uncertainty,
when they perceive the fine as inappropriately high. This is also the case in our experiment, but the Wilcoxon signed ranks
test shows that there is no significant difference in the punishment behavior between F = 1200 and F = 3600 (p = 0.35) for
q = 0. Thus, in line with our model, a higher fine leads to a significant reduction in the punishment frequency only with legal
uncertainty.
13Throughout the paper, we report two-sided p-values.
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Similarly to the impact of the fine size, we test the impact of legal uncertainty by a Wilcoxon signed
ranks test on the differences in the punishment thresholds, now comparing q = 0 and q = 50% for F = 1200
and for F = 3600, respectively. The respective p-values are both smaller than 0.001, so that H3 cannot be
rejected.
Note that, for q given, any exogenously given number of violators in the strategy method translates
into error types: for instance, for q = 50% and five violators (i.e. a violation frequency of φ = 5/12), the
probability of a type I-error in case of punishment is π = (1−φ)qφ+(1−φ)q =
7
17 = 41.2%, while the probability
of a type II-error in case of no-punishment is 1 − π = 58.8%. Let us next compare the risk of type-I and
type-II errors that players J are willing to take. Substituting for q = 50% and taking into account that the
violation frequency is φ = V/12, one can easily check that the frequencies of both error types are identical
for four violators; i.e. π = 1 − π = 0.5 for V = 4. For F = 1200, 18 players J have V ≤ 4 and 16 players
J have V > 4, while 14 judges have V ≤ 4 and 19 V > 4 for F = 3600. Thus, the type-I error aversion is
moderately increasing in the fine size.
4.2 Players V
For players V , we test the following three hypotheses:
H4. The violation frequency decreases in the punishment frequency.
H5. For identical punishment frequencies, the violation frequency is lower for F = 3600 compared to
F = 1200.
H6. For identical punishment frequencies and fines, the violation frequency is higher for q = 50%
compared to q = 0.
In line with H4, the Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients between the number of punishing players
J and the number of violators for our four decision situations are all significantly negative at p < 0.001.
For the tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6, we proceed analogously to players J by considering only those 131
out of 144 players V who behave consistently. Analogously to figure 1, figure 2 shows the share of violators
for each of the possible numbers of punishing players J and for each of the four decision situations.
Following the same logic as for players J , we define a threshold J̃i such that the i-th player V takes
the money if and only if J ≤ J̃i. In line with H5, a comparison of these thresholds for F = 1200 and
F = 3600 for the case with legal uncertainty yields p < 0.001 for the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Also in
line with our model, there is no significant impact of the fine size for q = 0 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
p = 0.191). Finally, in line with H6, the violation frequency is significantly lower for q = 0 compared to
q = 50% (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, p < 0.001 for both fines). Summing up, none of the six hypotheses on
the partial impacts of the magnitude of fines and legal uncertainty on the punishment and violation behavior
is rejected by our data.
5 Equilibrium impacts of fine size and uncertainty
So far, we have tested theoretical predictions that treat the behavior of the other market side as constant
(partial effects). In equilibrium, however, players V anticipate that fewer players J punish for high fines,
which is in turn anticipated by players J . Due to the aforementioned interdependencies of both players’
strategies, the total effects of F and q are less straightforward than the partial ones (see Proposition 2). Our


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of punishing players J
low fine, high uncertainty high fine, high uncertainty
low fine, no uncertainty high fine, no uncertainty
Figure 2: Violation frequencies.
5.1 Players J
For players J , table 2 summarizes the insights from Proposition 2.
Table 2: Theoretical results on equilibrium effects for players J .














We start with analyzing the impact of the fine, for which our model yields a clear hypothesis:
H7. For the case with legal uncertainty, the punishment frequency in equilibrium is lower for F = 3600
compared to F = 1200.
By contrast, it depends on the players J ’s preferences to avoid type-I relative to type-II errors whether the
equilibrium effect is larger or smaller than the partial effect. Thus, we state no hypothesis on the comparison
of the two effects, but it is nevertheless interesting to report and interpret our experimental findings.
Table 3 summarizes our data analysis for q = 50% and for the two fine levels. Taking the average over
all sessions, 9.3 out of 12 players V took the money for F = 1200, but only 5.3 for F = 3600 (see the entries
in the first row of table 3). To calculate these numbers, we consider the players V ’s unconditional behavior.
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Next, recall that the partial effect of the change in F on players J ’s punishment behavior needs to be
calculated under the counterfactual assumption that the violation frequency is independent of F . We hence
get the partial effect by assuming that the number of violators is the same for both fine sizes. If 9.3 players
V had taken the money for F = 3600 (as they did for F = 1200),14 we know from the strategy method
that 75.8% of players J would punish for F = 3600, compared to 79.4% for F = 1200. The difference is the
partial effect of the fine size as shown in the second row of table 3: If players J assumed that the higher
fine had no impact on the violation frequency, then an increase in the fine size from F = 1200 to F = 3600
would lead to a decline in the punishment frequency by 3.6 percentage points.15
Table 3: Partial and equilibrium impacts of the fine size on the punishment frequency
F = 1200 F = 3600
Actual violation frequency 9.3 (78%) 5.3 (44%)
Pun. frequency given 9 violators 79.4% 75.8%
Partial effect −3.6% points
Pun. frequency with actual violation frequency 79.4% 48.5%
Equilibrium effect −30.9% points
Violation frequency assumed by players J 6.8 4.6
The equilibrium effect is calculated by assuming that players J correctly anticipate the impact of the fine
size on the violation frequencies. Thus, we compare the actual number of violations, 9.3 for F = 1200 and 5.3
for F = 3600, which yields a rather large reduction in the punishment frequency by 30.9 percentage points.16
Furthermore, table 3 shows that the equilibrium effect is more pronounced than the partial effect. The
intuition is that players J who correctly anticipate players V ’s behavior reduce their punishment frequency
for two reasons; due to the higher fine size (direct effect) and due to the lower violation frequency (indirect
effect). The last row in table 3 shows that, while players J generally underestimate the violation frequencies
to some degree, they reasonably well anticipate the deterrence effect of higher fines.
We now turn to the impact of legal uncertainty. Recall from table 2 that our model yields no clear-cut
prediction for the equilibrium effect itself, but for the comparison to the partial effect:
H8. The equilibrium impact of legal uncertainty on the punishment frequency is smaller than the partial
effect.
Let us start with the upper part of table 4 which refers to F = 1200. The first row shows that legal
uncertainty leads to a large increase in the violation frequency. For the partial effect, we again need to
assume identical violation frequencies for both levels of q. We then find that legal uncertainty reduces the
punishment frequency by 3 percentage points. Interestingly, the equilibrium effect of legal uncertainty for
F = 1200 has the opposite sign, i.e. legal uncertainty even leads to a higher punishment frequency. While
this seems somewhat counter-intuitive, it does not contradict our theory which yields no clear-cut prediction
on the equilibrium impact of q: Intuitively, if players J anticipate that the violation frequency increases
14Alternatively, we could assume that the number of violators is 5.3 not only for F = 3600 as observed in the data but also
for F = 1200.
15We have already considered the partial effects in section 4 where we compared the thresholds for the number of violators
which triggers punishment. Here, we calculate them explicitly as to compare them to equilibrium effects.
16This is supported by a McNemar change test that compares players J ’s unconditional punishment decisions for q = 50%
for F = 1200 and F = 3600 (see the first row of Table 6, the difference of which is significant at p = 0.01).
15
Table 4: Partial and equilibrium impacts of legal uncertainty on the punishment frequency
F = 1200 q = 50% q = 0%
Actual violation frequency 9.3 (78%) 2.0 (17%)
Pun. frequency given 9 violators 79.4% 82.4%
Partial effect 3.0% points
Pun. frequency with actual violation frequency 79.4% 70.6%
Equilibrium effect −8.8% points
Violation frequency assumed by players J 6.8 3.4
F = 3600 q = 50% q = 0%
Actual violation frequency 5.3 (44%) 1.0 (8%)
Pun. frequency given 5 violators 48.5% 70.6%
Partial effect 22.1% points
Pun. frequency with actual violation frequency 48.5% 64.7%
Equilibrium effect 16.2% points
Violation frequency assumed by players J 4.6 1.7
sharply in response to uncertainty, then they may have incentives to punish more often. For F = 3600, the
equilibrium effect goes in the opposite direction with an equilibrium effect of 16.2 percentage points.
Most importantly, however, the results are in line with H8 for both fines as the equilibrium effect is always
smaller than the partial effect; -8.8 compared to 3.0 percentage points for the low fine, and 16.2 compared
to 22.1 percentage points for the high fine. Finally, while players J again underestimate the overall violation
frequency, they anticipate well that it is increasing in uncertainty.
Over all, our experimental evidence supports the argument that players J seek to anticipate adjustments
in the behavior of players V so as to minimize their disutility from making type-I and type-II errors. A
natural question is then that about the incidence of these errors. In our experiment, type II errors occurred
more frequently than type I errors as hypothesized by the Blackstone ratio: When there was legal uncertainty
(q = 50%), 19.4% of players J made a type-II error for F = 1200, and 27.8% of them made a type-II error
for F = 3600. Furthermore, the expected frequency of type-I errors is 11.8% of all cases for F = 1200 and
13.2% for F = 3600.17
5.2 Players V
The test of Proposition 2 for players V proceeds along the same lines. Table 5 summarizes our theoretical
results.
While our model does not predict the sign for the equilibrium effect of the fine, it yields the following
hypothesis:
H9. For the case with legal uncertainty, the equilibrium impact of the fine size on the violation frequency
is less pronounced than the partial impact.
17In our experiment design, the incidence of type-I errors is probabilistic. Given that player V has not violated but player
J has decided to punish if the donation has disappeared, whether a type-I error occurs depends on the random event that
determines whether the donation disappears exogenously. This was only drawn for the randomly chosen decision situation, but
not the three further decision situations.
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Table 5: Theoretical results on equilibrium effects for players V .














Table 6: Partial and equilibrium impacts of the fine size on the violation frequency
F = 1200 F = 3600
Actual punishment frequency 7.0 (58%) 3.7 (31%)
Viol. frequency given 7 punishers 34.4% 12.1%
Partial effect −22.3% points
Viol. frequency with actual pun. frequency 34.4% 27.3%
Equilibrium effect −7.1% points
Punishment frequency assumed by players V 6.3 5.0
To measure the partial effect, we follow the same logic as for players J . For F = 1200 and 7 punishers,
table 6 shows that the violation frequency is 34.4%. If 7 players J also punished for F = 3600, the violation
frequency would have been 12.1%. The difference of -22.3 percentage points thus captures the partial effect.
Using the actual number of violators of 3.7 for F = 3600 in row 3 then leads to an equilibrium reduction
by 7.1 percentage points. In line with H9, this shows that the deterrence effect of a higher fine is indeed
reduced when players V anticipate that players J punish less often.
While our model does not make a clear prediction on the equilibrium effect of higher fines on violation
frequencies, it is still interesting to study the empirical evidence. Table 6 documents a moderate, 7 percentage
points decrease in the violation frequency due to the increase in the fine.18 Row 4 shows that players V are
aware of the fact that the punishment frequency decreases in the fine, but they underestimate the effect size.
Our model next predicts that, even when taking the players J ’s behavior into account, higher legal
uncertainty reduces deterrence:
H10. In equilibrium, the violation frequency is higher for q = 50% compared to q = 0%.
In line with H10, table 7 shows equilibrium effects of -31.4 and -21.2 percentage points for a decrease in
q from 50% to 0% for the low and the high fine, respectively.19 Thus, even when players V anticipate that
players J are less willing to punish in case of legal uncertainty, uncertainty still leads to more violations.
This reinforces the view that legal uncertainty is worrisome not only from a justice point of view, but also
from a deterrence perspective.
5.3 Probit models on unconditional behavior
As all of our hypotheses on the equilibrium effects have been tested by applying the strategy method, it is
interesting to see if the main results are similar when we consider the unconditional behavior of players J
18Analyzing players V ’s unconditional decisions adds support to our result that the equilibrium effect of a higher fine on
violation frequencies is negative: for q = 50%, the first row of Table 3 shows that the violation frequency decreases from 77.8%
to 44.4% as the fine increases from 1200 to 3600 (McNemar change test, p < 0.01).
19Differences between partial and equilibrium effects, for which our theory yields no clear-cut prediction, are moderate.
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Table 7: Partial and equilibrium impacts of legal uncertainty on the violation frequency
F = 1200 q = 50% q = 0%
Actual punishment frequency 7.0 (58%) 10.3 (86%)
Viol. frequency given 7 punishers 34.4% 6.1%
Partial effect −28.3% points
Viol. frequency with actual pun. frequency 34.4% 3.0%
Equilibrium effect −31.4% points
Punishment frequency assumed by players V 6.3 10.0
F = 3600 q = 50% q = 0%
Actual punishment frequency 3.7 (31%) 10.0 (83%)
Viol. frequency given 4 punishers 27.3% 9.1%
Partial effect −18.2% points
Viol. frequency with actual pun. frequency 27.3% 6.1%
Equilibrium effect −21.2% points
Punishment frequency assumed by players V 5.0 9.6
and V in response to different levels of fines and uncertainty. In this case and by contrast to the strategy
method, players J and V can only form expectations on the behavior of the other market side.
For the unconditional behavior, table 8 presents the marginal effects of probit models using players J ’s
binary punishment and players V ’s binary violation decisions as dependent variables. In addition to dummy
variables for the high fine and the high level of uncertainty, the explanatory variables include a measure of
risk attitudes (i.e. the switching point in the Holt-Laury lottery20), the subjective importance of donations
for fighting poverty and the aversion against making type-I and type-II errors as elicited in our questionnaire.
Most importantly, the impacts of F and q are qualitatively the same as for the strategy method: Increasing
the fine from F = 1200 to F = 3600 or introducing uncertainty reduces the punishment frequency. For
violators, a higher fine increases deterrence, while introducing uncertainty increases violations. For both
market sizes, the impact of uncertainty is more pronounced than the increase in the fine. In line with the
assumptions of our model, players J who have a higher aversion against type-I errors punish less often, and
those players V who put higher emphasis on donations take the money less often.
6 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of fine size and legal uncertainty on the frequencies of punishments and legal infringe-
ments. In our theoretical model, we assume that legal decision makers have heterogeneous preferences with
respect to type-I and type-II errors, and that potential violators have different preference costs from violating
the law. Based on these assumptions, we first confirm theoretical results that higher uncertainty and higher
fines reduce the punishment frequency when legal decision makers treat the violation frequency as exoge-
nously given (partial effects). Analogously, higher uncertainty then increases, and higher fines reduce the
violation frequency. Taking the interdependency between the two market sides into account in order to ana-
lyze the equilibrium effects of fines and uncertainty, results turn out to be less straightforward: while higher
20A higher switching point implies a lower willingness to take risks.
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Table 8: Probit models on players J ’s punishment and V ’s violation decisions
(1) (2)
Players J Players V
F = 3600 -0.1477*** -0.2063***
(0.0406) (0.0477)
q = 50% -0.3920*** 0.4147***
(0.0466) (0.0386)
Switching Point 0.0568* -0.0264
(0.0304) (0.0220)
Donations Important 0.0325 -0.1362***
(0.0586) (0.0449)
Type-I Error Aversion -0.1186** 0.0628
(0.0559) (0.0617)
Type-II Error Aversion 0.0190 -0.0444**
(0.0170) (0.0182)
N 140 140
The table displays average marginal effects. Robust standard errors, which are clustered at the participant level, in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively.
fines still reduce the punishment frequency and higher uncertainty still increases the violation frequency, the
impact of the fine size on the violation frequency and the impact of uncertainty on the punishment frequency
turn out to be theoretically ambiguous.
We then conduct a laboratory experiment that allows us to test our hypotheses on partial effects and
equilibrium effects. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one that identifies and compares the
partial and equilibrium effects of fines and legal uncertainty. In the experiment, there are players V who may
decide to take money that was supposed to be donated to charity, and players J who are matched with a
player V whom they may punish based on an imperfect signal on whether this player V has actually taken the
money. Applying the strategy-method approach, we can elicit the players J ’s willingness to punish for each
exogenously given number of violators. Players J ’s decisions translate into the probability of type-I errors in
case of punishment, and into the probability of type II-errors in case of no punishment. Partial effects can
then be analyzed by using the counterfactual assumption that the violation frequency is independent of the
fine size and legal uncertainty, while equilibrium effects can be studied by considering the actual violation
frequencies.
Our experimental results are in line with our theoretical predictions. Assuming that the behavior of the
other market side is given (partial effects), higher fines reduce the violation and the punishment frequency,
while legal uncertainty increases the number of violations and decreases the punishment frequency. Also in
line with our theory, a higher fine leads to a significant reduction in the punishment frequency if and only if
there is legal uncertainty.
Our findings on equilibrium effects seem to be important from a legal perspective: First, they suggest
that the impact of legal uncertainty on the punishment frequency is lower than the partial effect, because
judges anticipate that the violation incentive increases in uncertainty. This is a countervailing effect that
ceteris paribus reduces the risk of type I-errors, and hence enhances the punishment incentive. Second, our
19
empirical results support previous theoretical results that the deterrence effect of higher fines is reduced by
the fact that violators anticipate that judges punish less often. And third, in our experiment legal uncertainty
increases the violation frequency even in equilibrium, which reinforces the view on the benefits of thorough
investigations and a well-functioning legal system.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
If Sα and Sm are intervals, α̃ ∈ Sα and m̃ ∈ Sm, then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium p∗ and φ∗ is given by
the solution to the system of equations








φ∗ = φ(p∗;F, q) = H(m̃(p∗;F, q)) = H (A[(1− p∗)(1− v) + qv]− Fp∗(1− q)(1− v)) . (8)



























Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Punishment and Violation Probabilities. The system of
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∂F < 0, and
∂α̃
∂q < 0. Hence, the
denominators of all right-hand sides are positive and larger than 1, and the numerator of the right-hand side
of (16) is positive, and that of (17) is negative, which proves part (i) of the proposition. Furthermore, by
(9), (10), (11) and (12), part (ii) of the proposition follow immediately. 
B Translated version of sample instructions
In the following, we present sample instructions for the treatment in which participants A (”potential viola-
tors”) use the strategy method. The instructions for the treatment in which participants B (”judges”) used
the strategy methods differed as minimally as possible, i.e. only concerning the decision screens and their
description.
General explanations
Welcome to this economic experiment.
In the following, we will explain how you can earn money by making decisions in this experiment. Please
read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to your
seat.
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During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk to the other participants, to use cell phones, or
to launch any programs on the computer. Disregarding any of these rules will lead to your exclusion from
the experiment and from all payments.
During the experiment we do not talk about Euro but points. Your total payment will be calculated in
points first. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into Euro, using the following
rule:
500 points = 1 Euro.
At the end of the experiment you will receive your payment in cash. Your payment in this ex-
periment depends on your own decisions and possibly on those of the other participants. Additionally, you
will get 2000 points for attending the experiment in time that will be paid at the end of the experiment,
independent of your decisions.
On the next pages, we describe the exact procedures of the experiment.
The experiment
In this experiment, there are two types of participants, A and B. You have been randomly assigned
the role of participant A.21 There are as many participants A as participants B. Pairs consisting of one
randomly chosen participant A and one randomly chosen participant B are matched. You will not get any
information on your assigned participant’s identity, neither before nor after the experiment. Your assigned
participant will not get any information on your identity, either.
At the beginning of the decision phase, all participants A and B receive an initial endowment of 2400 points
each. Additionally to the initial endowments, a donation of 2400 points to SOS Kinderdorf is planned
for each pair. SOS-Kinderdorf supports children and families in the poorest regions of the world (medi-
cal care, school enrollment etc.), in crisis areas, but also neglected children and adolescents in Germany.
SOS-Kinderdorf has been granted the DZI-certificate that attests reliability and low administrative costs.
Participant A has the possibility to take the 2400 points that are designated for the donation (“donation”)
for himself. If he decides to do so, there will not be any donation to SOS-Kinderdorf and participant A’s
payment will rise by 2400 points to 4800 points.
Participant B can observe whether the 2400 points that are designated for donation for SOS-Kinderdorf
are available or have disappeared. IMPORTANT: If the donation has disappeared, there are two possible
reasons why the donation has disappeared. First, participant A has taken the donation for himself. Second,
if participant A has decided not to take the donation, the donation can disappear by chance. This happens
with probability q%. Later (but before your decisions) we will tell you the exact value of q.
Only in case participant B observes that the 2400 points for donation have disappeared, he
has the possibility to reduce participant A’s payment by a pre-specified number of points F
21Instructions for players B differed only in this sentence: You have been randomly assigned the role of participant B (instead
of A).
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(“deduction points”). These deduction points will always additionally be donated to SOS-Kinderdorf.
Later (but before your decisions) we will tell you the exact value of F.
If participant B decides to deduct points from participant A, participant A’s payment will be reduced
by the deduction points for sure and participant A’s payment is 2400 - F points. If participant A had
taken the donation for himself, it is still donated to SOS-Kinderdorf in case participant B decided to deduct
points. If the donation had disappeared by chance, it remains lost and will not be donated.
If participant B decides not to deduct any points from participant A, participant A earns his whole ini-
tial endowment of 2400 points. If participant A had taken the donation for himself, he gets this money ad-
ditionally and will earn 2400 + 2400 points donation = 4800 points. There is no donation to SOS-Kinderdorf.
To put it differently: If participant B observes that the donation has disappeared, he cannot always be
sure whether it has disappeared by chance or because participant A took the donation. If participant B then
decides to reduce participant A’s points, he might do it although participant A did not take the donation.
If participant B decides not to reduce participant A’s points and participant A took the money, participant
A is allowed to keep the money and there is no donation to SOS-Kinderdorf.
Independent of his decision, participant B always receives his initial endowment of 2400 points in cash at the
end of the experiment. If the donation has disappeared, participant B’s decision influences participant A’s
payment and the amount donated to SOS-Kinderdorf. Consequently, it depends on participant A’s and B’s
decisions and on chance whether the donation (2400 points) will indeed be donated to SOS-Kinderdorf. If
the donation is available at the end of the experiment, it will be donated to SOS-Kinderdorf
for real!
Altogether, you will make decisions in four different decision situations during this experiment. All
decision situations correspond to the description above. They only differ in the amount of deduction
points F and in the probability q of the donation disappearing by chance if participant A did not
take the donation. One out of the four decision situations is chosen randomly. This randomly chosen deci-
sion situation and participant A’s and participant B’s decisions in this situation determine both participants’
payments, whether there is a donation and which amount is donated to SOS-Kinderdorf. This means that all
decision situations are chosen to be paid out with the same probability. Therefore, all decisions are important.


































The table enables participants A to condition their decision “take the donation - yes or no?” on the number
of participants B who deduct F points from their participant A’s payment if they observe that the donation
has disappeared. As soon as all participants B made their decision, it is determined which row of the table
corresponds to the actual decisions made by the participants B in this room. Participant A’s decision (“take
the donation - yes or no?”) for this row of the table is implemented.
Example: 5 out of 12 participants B in this room decide to deduct points if the donation has disappeared.
Therefore, A’s decision in the row in which the 5 is written in the first column will be implemented.
For their decision, participants A click on YES or NO in all rows of the table on the corresponding screen
and continue by pressing the OK-button. Afterwards, three further decisions will follow that differ in the
value of possible deduction points F and / or in the probability q.
At the same time participants B will see the following screen:
Participants B click either YES or NO on the corresponding screen and continue by pressing the OK-button.
Thereafter, three further decisions will follow that differ in the value of possible deduction points F and / or
in the probability q.
IMPORTANT! Please note:
If q=0% and participant B observes that the donation has disappeared, he knows for sure that
participant A took the donation for himself. There is no uncertainty about why the donation has
disappeared because it is not possible that it has disappeared by chance (q=0%).
For q=50%, the following table shows how likely it is that participant B observes that the donation has
disappeared if a particular number of participants A takes the donation for themselves.
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For q=50%: If as many participants A in this room
decide to take the donation for themselves . . .
. . . this percentage of participants B observe that
the donation has disappeared.
0 (none) 50%
3 von 12 62.5%
6 von 12 75%
9 von 12 87.5%
12 (all) 100%
After all participants made their four decisions, one of these four decision situations is chosen randomly. For
this decision situation, all participants will see a feedback screen with the following information:
• Randomly chosen decision situation (exact value of deduction points F and probability q)
• Decisions of all participants (A: take donation - yes or no, B: deduct points - yes or no)
• Has the donation disappeared - yes or no?
• Resulting payments for participants A and B as well as final donation
At the end of the experiment all participants A and B are paid their points in cash and the donation to
SOS-Kinderdorf will be implemented for real if the money for the donation is available. Before we will show
you a second feedback screen, we kindly ask you to answer several questions. Some questions can increase
your earnings.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your seat to answer
your questions. As soon as all questions are answered we will start the experiment on the computer. Before
your decisions, we would like to ask you to answer several computerized questions concerning the rules of
the experiment in order to ensure that you will be able to make well-informed decisions later on.
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